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The article touches upon the issue of precedent (in both the codified law and common law sys-
tems) as a source of law. The author presents concepts of the law philosophers, often contradictory 
to one another, which refer to the understanding of the very term ‘source of law’. The possibility of 
qualifying judicial rulings, including precedents, as a source of law, is also examined. The author 
compares the functioning of precedents (quasi-precedents) in legal systems of a number of countries 
(including the USA, England, Slovakia, Poland, Germany, and Sweden), with special emphasis on 
Slovakia. It is also emphasised that the rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal of the Slovak Republic 
have a binding power for courts, provided they are petitioners of the proceedings. The Supreme 
Court rulings have two kinds of a binding power. The first of them is a cassation power (in a case 
being the subject of the proceedings), and the second one is a precedential binding power, which is 
characterised by the lack of obligation of being applied by common courts.
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THESAURUS
First of all a few words on distinguishing: Qui bene distinguit, bene docet. 
Who distinguishes well, learns well. Distinguishing (διακρισις, distinctio) was an 
assumption of the scholastic method, and it plays a great role in the discussion as 
well later on as in the doctrine of precedent. Distinctio modalis is one of its forms 
which can be identified either between a thing and the various modes of its sub-
sistence or among the various modes or ways in which a thing exists.
Law or the legal system (συστημα as a whole composed of many separate 
parts) is predominantly (although not exclusively) a matter of rules.





In the relationship to law I prefer the word “rule” (measure, criterion), 
rather than the word “norm”, although the objection could be raised that they are 
synonyms (Greek varieties are κανών, γνώμων; the Latin one is regula, that is why 
also regulation)1.
The concept of rule is based on the supposition that a rule can be either gen-
eral or individual. General rules and individual rules are parts, modes, species, 
forms, elements or varieties of law (legal system). Individual rules also belong to 
the legal system (in the sense of being law).
Legislatio must not necessarily (exclusively) be linked only with legislation 
as the creation of general norms, but also with the entire function of creating law. 
There can be also “judicial legislation”. Law is not necessarily linked only with the 
sense “statute” (as lex); it may represent also a universal name of all the modes of 
law. However, from the point of view of the doctrine of sources of law legislation 
appears as the paradigm source of law2.
Statute law can be defined as any law which is made directly, or in the way 
of proper legislation. Judiciary law is any law, which is made indirectly, or in 
the way of judicial or improper legislation.
The principal difference between statute law and judiciary law lies in a dif-
ference between the forms in which they are respectively expressed. A statute 
law is expressed in general or abstract terms or wears the form or shape of 
a law or rule. A law (or rule of law) made by judicial decisions, exists nowhere in 
a general or abstract form.
And what about the self-confident opinion of Paulus about the relationship 
between regula and ius (sceptical towards subsumption): “Non regula ius sumatur, 
sed ex iure, quod est, regula fiat. Not from the rule (an abstract sentence) law is con-
cluded, but from the accessible law (law at hand, at disposal) the rule is created”3.
1  Here I do not enter into a discussion about rules, norms or principles. Just it is to be mentioned 
that e.g. Robert Alexy puts rules and principles together under the roof of the concept of norm. See: 
R. Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, Baden-Baden 1994, p. 72. Also see, e.g. the definition of “norm” 
in: E. Pattaro, The Law and the Right, [in:] A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, 
Vol. 1, Dordrecht 2005, p. 415. The statue of Polykleitos was called κανών as a measure acknowledged 
for the beauty relationships of the human body. Valid principles of rhetoric and grammar have been 
also called κανών.
2  R.A. Shiner, Legal Institutions and the Sources of Law, [in:] A Treatise of Legal Philosophy 
and General Jurisprudence, Vol. 3, Dordrecht 2005, p. 7 (Chapter 2: Legislation).
3  Paulus, Digesta, 50, 17, 1.
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INTERMEZZO
Aleksander Peczenik is still in good memories: at the time of a round table 
discussion in the High Tatras in Slovakia in May 1996 there was an exchange of 
views on the sources of law and on the role of the precedents in the legal systems 
of Sweden, Poland and Slovakia.
Let me say that legal reasoning in Sweden has some special properties. Legal problems are in 
Sweden often viewed as a problem of harmonization of the statutes and other materials often regar-
ded as sources of law; e.g. travaux préparatoires, precedents, standard contracts, collective labour 
agreement and juristic literature are prominent sources of this kind4.
From the Slovak side, the status of the travaux préparatiores has been discussed 
as a matter closely related to a source of law (especially explanatory reports in 
connection with statutes)5. The paradigm of Aleksander Peczenik was already that 
time that a legal system must be presented as a coherent whole.
ON THE SOURCES OF LAW: SHOULD WE PUT PRECEDENTS 
IN THIS CATEGORY?
John Austin is in his work abot the uses of the study of jurisprudence is making 
a distinction also between necessary concepts and unnecessary concepts6. Is the 
concept of “sources of law” really a necessary one?
The concept of sources of law is not free from ambiguity and it is interpreted 
in various ways7. John Austin in his Lectures on Jurisprudence, when he is dealing 
with the various sources of law, tries to be very exact:
In many legal treatises, and especially in treatises which profess to expound the Roman law, 
that department or division which regards the or igin of  laws, is frequently entitled De juris fon-
tibus. This expression fontes juris, or sources  of  law, is, of course, metaphorical and is used in 
two meanings. In one of its senses, the sources of a law is its direct  or  immediate  author. […] 
4  A. Peczenik, The Ways of Legal Certainty, [in:] Rule of Law. Collection of Papers, ed. 
A. Bröstl, Košice 1996, pp. 22–27.
5  See: A. Bröstl, On Legal Doctrine and Some Rechtsstaat-Principles, [in:] Rule of Law…, 
pp. 8–13.
6  J. Austin, On the Study of Jurisprudence, [in:] The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, 
Indianopolis–Cambridge 1998, pp. 367–368.
7  E. Pattaro, Temi e problemi di filosofia de diritto, Bolona 1994, p. 24: “The notion of the 
sources of law is, on the face of it, ambiguous because it assumes what the law is and does not specify 
the term »source«”. H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, Wien 1960 (new-print 2000), p. 238: “The source 
of law (when he is speaking about the “so-called” sources of law – A.B.) is a metaphorical expression, 
which has more than one meaning”.





In another acceptation of the term, the fountains or sources of laws are the or iginal  or ear l ies t 
extant  monuments  or documents  by which the existence and purport of the body of law may 
be known or conjectured8.
And so, (in regard to the English law) the statutes, the reports of judicial deci-
sions, with the old and authoritative treatises which are equivalent to reports, may 
be deemed sources (in the sense last mentioned) of English jurisprudence, 
whilst the treatises on the English law, which merely expound the matter of those 
statutes and reports, are not sources of English jurisprudence, but are properly 
a legal literature drawn or derived from the sources9.
Sources of law are linked with the essence of law, with the essential rules 
(regulations) or the foundations. Basic of a source of law is the generality of 
the rule (norm) which is been considered as it.
Maybe the first distinction made within the sources of law is this one concerning 
sources of law in the material sense and in the formal sense (fontes iuris oriundi). 
Norberto Bobbio distinguishes at least three sources of law: sources for the validity 
of law, sources of law-making, sources for the cognition of law10.
Sources of law (fontes iuris cognoscendi) are also possibly divided into official 
and unofficial sources11. Official sources include first of all the Collection of Laws 
(e.g., Dziennik Ustaw, Zbierka zákonov or Gesetzesblatt). Looking for an example 
it is possible to mention Article 87 Section 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Poland adopted on April 2, 1997, which stands: “The sources of universally bind-
ing law of the Republic of Poland shall be the Constitution, statutes, ratified 
international agreements (treaties), and regulations”12.
Act No. 400/2015 Collection of Laws in the Slovak Republic on Creating 
Legal Regulations and on the Collection of Laws of the Slovak Republic and on 
the amendment of other legal regulations in its second part points out as official 
“sources” (although the word is not used here) “legal regulations, other legal acts 
and acts of international law”13. By legal regulations there is meant an abbre-
viation for the “generally binding legal regulations” which are declared in the § 1 
8  J. Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law, New York 1875, p. 255.
9  Ibidem.
10  N. Bobbio, Consuetudine e fatto normativo, [in:] Contributi ad un dizionario guiridico, Turin 
1994. See also: A. Rotolo, Sources of Law in the Civil Law, [in:] A Treatise of Legal Philosophy…, 
Vol. 3, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3505-5_30, p. 143 ff. A special critical theory concern-
ing solely the problem of the sources of law has been developed by Alf Ross. See: A. Ross, Theorie 
der Rechtsquellen. Ein Beitrag zur Theorie des positiven Rechts auf Grundlage dogmenhistorischer 
Untersuchungen. Kap. XII. Der Begriff der Rechtsquelle, Aalen 1989, pp. 290–315.
11  L. Morawski, Wstęp do prawoznawstwa, Toruń 1998, p. 106 ff.
12  M. Dąbrowski, Źródła prawa powszechnie obowiązującego w Konstytucji z 1997 r. – katalog 
zamknięty czy otwarty?, „Studia Prawnoustrojowe” 2004, nr 3, p. 91 ff.
13  In this paper I do not deal with “acts of international law” in this sense with international 
treaties.
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Constitution of the Slovak Republic (henceforth as Constitution), constitutional 
acts, statutes (acts), ordinances of the Government of the Slovak Republic, and 
measures of the ministries, other central authorities of state administration, other 
authorities of state administration and the National Bank of the Slovak Republic.
As sources of law in a formal sense are usually considered the statutory law 
and the customary law14. The position that the court used law and the judge-made-
-law have no autonomous authority, comparable with those of the customary law, 
was dominating in the period of the origin of the Civil Code in Germany (Bürgerli-
ches Gesetzbuch). The fathers of this Code have referred to Bernhard Windscheid, 
but at the same time they have announced that they consider the customary law 
as “a product of the further-creating activity (fortbildende Tätigkeit) of a judge”.
What are the constituent elements of a legal system? Does it consist exclusive-
ly of the rules of law (legal rules) which have found expression in statutes and in 
precedents and which provide more or less clearly how particular questions are to 
be decided?15
How important and valuable is the concept of “sources of law?” Is it just able 
to bring confusions? Hans Kelsen also states that “legislation and customary law 
are often designated as the two »sources« of law”16, whereupon under “law” only 
general norms (rules) of the state law are understood. “But”, to continue in the ar-
gumentation of Hans Kelsen by the part which I am sharing too, “individual legal 
norms (rules) also belong to the law, they are part of the legal order 
(system) together with the general norms (rules), on the basis of which they were 
created”17.
CONTINUATION ON PRECEDENTS AND THEIR BINDING FORCE
So, what about precedents? Thomas Hobbes was particularly sceptical about the 
value of precedent. To rely on the authority of precedent cases in his view would 
make justice depend on the decisions of a few learned or ignorant men.
Justice Benjamin Cardozo in his The Nature of the Judicial Process is providing 
us by his understanding of the role of a precedent (in creating legal certainty): “If 
a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the same decision. It 
would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on opposite principles”18.
14  H. Hübner, Allgemeiner Teil des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches, Berlin–New York 1996, p. 14.
15  A. Grabowski, Juristic Concept of the Validity of Statutory Law: A Critique of Contemporary 
Nonpositivism, Heidelberg–Berlin 2013, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27688-0, p. 1.
16  Similarly e.g. H. Hübner, op. cit., p. 14: “As sources of law in the formal sense statutory law 
and customary law are considered”.
17  H. Kelsen, op. cit., pp. 238–239.
18  B.N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, New Haven–London 1921, p. 33.





Justice William O. Douglas also attributed faithfulness to precedent as a matter 
of equality of justice, when he stated: “There will be no justice under law if a neg-
ligence rule is applied in the morning but not in the afternoon”19.
Ronald Dworkin distinguishes in the line with the British and American lawyers 
when they speak about the doctrine of precedent between the “strict doctrine of 
precedent” (it obliges the judges to follow the earlier decisions of certain courts, 
even if they believe those decisions to be wrong) and the “relaxed doctrine” (just 
to give some weight to past decisions on the same issue)20.
Taking into consideration the American law/legal system Frederick Schauer 
notes21 that the pure acknowledgement of the “binding authority” in no way justifies 
an absolute duty to follow, but merely implicates the existence of “authoritative 
reasons”, which could be overlaid by reasons of the same range or by reasons of 
a different nature. Joseph Raz points out to the conceptional strong binding force of 
the precedents in English law, but he also notices that judges in common law have 
a surprising flexibility at the application of the precedents22. Within the common 
law, the principle stare decisis is used distinctly strict. The main connecting-point 
Joseph Raz sees not in the determination of ratio decidendi, but in the technique 
of distinguishing.
In his large work published in 201723 and concerning precedents Mehrdad 
Payandeh concludes of the “norm-accesority” of the precedents, praising them as 
a “contribution to the content of the legal norms”.
The judicial decision does not become a source of law in the sense of “binding 
normative validity”, but it becomes a comparative measure of the later juristic 
(legal) reasoning24.
When speaking about precedents in the continental legal system (with focusing 
on Slovakia), there are two possibilities to speak about them (precedents or quasi- 
-precedents): decisions of the two “highest courts” are concerned.
There is an old refrain: the institutional power of the highest courts is derived 
from their competence to decide upon remedies or other procedural means raised 
against decisions of lower courts. It applies at least theoretically that non-respecting 
of a constantly and consistently defended legal opinion of a higher court by a low-
er court is running the risk that its decision may be overruled/abolished later on. 
19  Search in: M.I. Urofsky, William O. Douglas a Common Law Judge, “Duke Law Journal” 
1991, Vol. 41, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/1372702, p. 133 ff.
20  R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, Cambridge 1986, pp. 24–25 ff.
21  F. Schauer, Authority and Authorities, “Virginia Law Review” 2008, No. 94, p. 1991.
22  J. Raz, The Authority of Law, Oxford 1998, pp. 183–184.
23  M. Payandeh, Judikative Rechtserzeugung: Theorie, Dogmatik und Methodik der Wirkungen 
der Präjudizen, Tübingen 2017, p. 136 ff.
24  K. Larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft, Berlin 1991, DOI: https://doi.org/ 
10.1007/978-3-662-08711-4, p. 432.
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Precedents are established this way, by the decision-making of the highest courts. 
The mission of the continental courts is still understood more/rather in the level of 
a guarantee of constitutionality and legality of the application of law by lower courts 
than in the level of an autonomous law-making activity. This is indirectly confirmed 
by the fact that the ratio decidendi of a decision becomes legally binding only after 
its repeated confirmation by the competent highest court in its decision-making 
activity. The role of a continental court is first of all to apply law (statutes)25.
In the relationship to the decisions of the Supreme Court of the Slovak 
Republic and to their binding force and their impact on the decision-making of 
“lower” courts (before the establishment of the Constitutional Court in spring 
1993)26, there is not possible to speak about precedents in the real sense of the 
word. The best distinction and introduction in this respect has been made in the 
decision of the Regional Court from 14 May 2014, which is worth to be quoted:
Legal theory and judicial practice are distinguishing between two basic types of binding force 
of the Supreme Court decisions – the cassation (instance, e.g. in the same matter) binding force, and 
the precedential (judicatory) binding force. Since in the first case of the so-called cassation-binding 
force the lower court is always obliged in unchanged real and legal circumstances of the matter 
accept the legal opinion of the Supreme Court declared in the decision, in the case of the so-called 
precedential binding force there exists a possibility for the general court of any degree (instance) to 
reflect/not reflect the legal conclusions of the Supreme Court in the way, that the respective court 
will in good fight its concurring considerations and it will begin a kind of reasonable legal dialogue 
with the concrete decision of the Supreme Court27.
Act No. 400/2015 Collection of Laws in the Slovak Republic on Creating Le-
gal Regulations and on the Collection of Laws of the Slovak Republic and on the 
amendment of other legal regulations.
Other (legal) acts published (promulgated) via Collection of Laws (Journal of 
Laws) are mentioned – among them § 13 letter a) of the Act No. 400/2015 Col-
lection of Laws: the decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak 
Republic as a special judicial body of protection of the Constitution.
The binding force of these decisions (decisions on the compliance of a statute/
Act with the Constitution) according to the respective Act No. 385/2000 Collection 
of Laws on Judges and Assessors is in relationship to the judges defined in § 2 
Section 3 as it follows:
A judge is in the exercise of its function independent, in decision-making bound only by the 
Constitution of the Slovak Republic, by a Constitutional Act, by an international treaty pursue to 
25  R. Procházka, M. Káčer, Teória práva, Bratislava 2013, p. 235.
26  P. Toth-Vaňo, On the Precedential Binding Force of the Judicial Decision (Also According 
to the Civil Dispute Order). O precedentnej záväznosti súdneho rozhodnutia (aj podľa Civilného 
sporového poriadku), „Justičná revue“ 2016, No. 68, pp. 603–621.
27  Resolution of the Regional Court in Banská Bystrica, No. 17 Co 410/2014 /of 14 May 2014.





Article 7 Section 2 and 5 of the Constitution, and by a Statute. The legal opinion of the Constitutio-
nal Court of the Slovak Republic included into the content of its decision issued in the proceedings 
according to Article 125 Section 1 of the Constitution initiated on the proposal of a court has for the 
court a binding force.
According to Article 125 Section 6 of the Constitution valid decisions of the 
Constitutional Court issued within the proceedings on compliance legal regulations 
with the Constitution are generally binding. A judge cannot reject his/her binding 
by the finding of the Constitutional Court with reference to Article 144 Section 1 
of the Constitution (Judges are independent…)28.
Expressed in another language the decisions (findings if we exactly follow 
the texture of the legal regulations in this respect) of the plenary of the Constitu-
tional Court are important because of its elements of generality and binding force. 
Beside the decision (finding) of the Constitutional Court in the proceedings on 
the compliance of statutes with the Constitution it concerns also another type of 
plenary decision (before, until 2001 a decision of a Senate) of the Constitutional 
Court issued in the proceedings on the interpretation of the Constitution of the 
Slovak Republic or a Constitutional Act (in case if there is a dispute between two 
authorities) pursue to Article 128 of the Constitution.
These two types of decisions of the Constitutional Court “are binding erga 
omnes and pro futuro”29, until the Constitutional Court does not change them by 
itself or if there will be a change (amendment) of the Constitution. The decisions of 
the Constitutional Court are “abstract precedents de iure, because they are generally 
binding ex constitutione”30.
DO JUDGES MAKE-LAW? DO THEY APPLY LAW? 
WHAT ARE THEY DOING?
Is it possible to defend the thesis that judges are making law regardless to 
the type of legal culture they are part of?
Classical Athens had no notion of binding precedent, but litigants in the sur-
viving court speeches frequently referred to past court verdicts in making their 
arguments.
William Blackstone in this respect assumes that the judge is not empowered to 
make (to create) new law, his task is to observe (maintain, uphold) and to interpret 
28  J. Drgonec, Súdna tvorba práva ako prostriedok uplatnenia zákona, zabezpečenia spravodli-
vosti a právnej istoty (Judicial Law-Making as a Means of Application of a Statute, Securing Justice, 
and Legal Security), „Justičná revue“ 2008, Vol. 60, pp. 711–727.
29  T. Ľalík, O sudcovskej tvorbe práva (On the Judge Law-Making), „Justičná revue“ 2014, No. 1, 
p. 16.
30  Ibidem.
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the old law (as a maximum: to clean the old law from wrong interpretations). John 
Austin in his criticism of Bentham’s position toward judge-made law, among others 
delivers this explanation: “I cannot understand how any person who has considered 
the subject can suppose that society could possibly have gone on if judges had 
not legislated […]”. He goes even further in his conclusion: “That part of the 
law of every country which was made by judges has been far better made than that 
part which consists of statutes enacted by the legislative”31.
The office of the judge is older than the modern theory of separation of power: 
it is into this doctrine only in a manner, as it was mentioned by Rudolf Smend in 
1962: “The Judiciary is only found by the separation of power and badly and ordered 
into its scope”. Christoph Schönberger continues in this sense:
This lies in the paradox of the bindingness of the judge by the law. The judge is bound by the law, 
but he is deciding on the basis of his/her independence on what shall be understood by the binding 
law he is bound by. This paradox became especially clear in relationship to the highest courts, to the 
Grenzgerichte, as the Austrians say32.
The whole problem is traditionally nipped in continental Europe. Since the 
transition to a modern constitutional state, there has been a kind of reasoning here 
dealing with a contradiction-pair of law-making and law-applying. Law-making is 
linked with and located at the first power and in a limited scope also at the second 
power; the third one – the judicial power – shall only be occupied by the application 
of law. This view has been very consequently followed in the constitutional law 
of the French Revolution. That time Maximilien de Robespierre was even very 
eager to take out the word “jurisprudence” in the sense the judge-law-making from 
the use of the language. It is looking like the radicality of The Incorruptible is in 
the same cold-up form still partially well-present in our out-dated doctrine of the 
“sources of law”33.
According to Jerzy Wróblewski, an increased use of general clauses in legisla-
tion has denoted a more or less open delegation of norm-creating power from the 
legislator to the courts of justice34.
31  J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence…, p. 191.
32  Ch. Schönberger, Höchstrichterliche Rechtsfindung und Auslegung gerichtlicher Entschei-
dungen, „Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer“ 2012, Bd. 71, 
pp. 298–299.
33  Ibidem. M. Robespierre: “Ce mot de jurisprudence des tribunaux, dans l’acception qu’il avait 
dans notre ancien régime, ne signifie plus rien dans le nouveau ; il doit etre effacé de notre langue. 
Dans un État qui a une Constitution, une législation, la jurisprudence des tribunaux nést autre chose 
que le loi : alors il y toujours identité de jurisprudence”.
34  Wróblewski enumerates the following sources of law acknowledged with his ideology of free 
decision-making: legal practice, social rules, social facts and social regularities, evaluation of facts 
connected with law. See: J. Wróblewski, The Judicial Application of Law, Dordrecht–Boston 1992, 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8050-2, pp. 270, 273–314.





In the legal system of the Federal Republic of Germany (which is considered 
to be strongly statute-oriented) the concept of precedent is defined broadly, in the 
sense of any prior court decision or decisions which may have bearing on a later 
case, which decisive emphasis is still laid on the justificatory reasons given in 
support of the prior decision. Precedents are frequently cited by the higher courts, 
and they are usually followed by the lower courts. However, if a court deviates 
from a precedent it will usually identify the prior decision in question and openly 
set out its reason for departing from it35.
The precedent-connected term Richterrecht (judge-made-law) is in Germany 
also used ambiguously. It concerns all decision-rules (value measures), which are 
impossible to be “taken out” from the statute without any valuable, command-cre-
ating acts of a judge. Usually, judgements made by the last instance courts are 
meant here36. According to the majority opinion the judge-made-law is denied to 
have the source of law “quality”. This position is based on the view concerning 
the theory of the division of power: for this theory, the law-making (creating) acts 
of the judiciary are alien to the system of law.
According to the probably prevailing view in Germany, there are only two 
sources of law of domestic law: legislation and customary law (traditional authors 
like Enneccerus, Karl Larenz). The position that the court used law and the judge-
-made-law have no autonomous authority, comparable with those of the customary 
law, was dominating in the period of the preparation and adoption of the Civil Code.
Later on, more and more the self-standing importance of the judiciary law 
(judge-made-law) has been acknowledged, partially it was also politically wel-
comed. Even supporters faithful to statutes belonging to the school of Interessen-
jurisprudenz did not close up themselves before this doctrine.
As Karl Engisch points out:
[…] in the course of our searching became in many places clear that statutes can be applied, 
interpreted and if necessary amended and set forth on the basis of evaluations which are belonging to 
the “greater cosmos” of law, in which the statutes are integrated. Once again it should be commemo-
rated that the subsumption (e.g. of a truck under the concept of a “enclosed space”) is not anymore 
unambiguously flowing out from the statute and from its ratio readable evaluative equalization/iden-
tification of the case to be decided with the cases doubtless concerned, that further the application of 
the principle “cessante ratione…” is asking for an evaluation which is reaching far out of the statute37.
Coming back again, the aim of the doctrine of the sources of law is to determine 
the criteria for establishing what the law is: “In this way, the mentioned doctrine is 
35  See more detailed characteristics in: R. Siltala, A Theory of Precedent: From Analytical 
Positivism to a Post-Analytical Philosophy of Law, Oxford–Portland 2000, pp. 123–127.
36  B. Rüthers, Rechtstheorie, München 2011, p. 149.
37  K. Engisch, Einführung in das juristische Denken, Stuttgart–Berlin–Köln 1989, p. 192.
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connected with the concept of law, because a source of law can become only this 
what has been before acknowledged as law”38.
Finally, in responding to the question about the modes, species or forms of law 
(instead of insisting upon the question about the determination and identification of 
sources of law and non-sources of law), the question of the nature of the precedent 
and its binding force probably such a structured answer can be offered (and further 
discussed, of course) as Eugenio Bulygin is going for:
a) judicial decisions are complex entities that contain both individual rules/
norms and general rules/norms,
b) in an important sense of “creating” is that judges do not create individual 
rules/norms; instead, they create, at least in some instances general rules/
norms,
c) while the general rules/norms created by judges are not binding, they can 
come into force, and when they do, they become a part of the legal order,
d) an important contribution to the creation of law is the formulation of defi-
nitions of legal concepts by judges,
e) case law is the set of general rules/norms in force that are created by judges 
and the definitions in force that are formulated by judges39.
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STRESZCZENIE
W artykule poruszono problematykę precedensu (w systemie common law i systemie prawa 
stanowionego) jako źródła prawa. Autor przedstawia koncepcje filozofów prawa, często przeciw-
stawne, dotyczące rozumienia samego terminu „źródło prawa”. Ponadto analizuje możliwość kwa-
lifikacji orzeczeń sądowych (w tym precedensowych) jako źródła prawa oraz dokonuje porównania 
funkcjonowania precedensu (quasi-precedensu) w systemach prawnych kilku państw (m.in. Stanów 
Zjednoczonych, Anglii, Słowacji, Polski, Niemiec i Szwecji), z położeniem nacisku na Słowację. 
Autor podaje, iż orzeczenia Trybunału Konstytucyjnego Republiki Słowackiej mają moc wiążącą dla 
sądów, jeżeli były one wnioskodawcą postępowania. Orzeczenia Sądu Najwyższego posiadają dwa 
rodzaje mocy wiążącej. Pierwsza to moc kasacyjna (w sprawie będącej przedmiotem rozpatrzenia), 
druga zaś – precedensowa moc wiążąca, charakteryzuje się brakiem obowiązku zastosowania przez 
sądy powszechne.
Słowa kluczowe: precedens; quasi-precedens; źródło prawa
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